Study of the Bullwhip Effect in the Oil and Gas Industry by Azhar, Mina
THE STUDY OF THE BULLWHIP EFFECT 




   By 
   MINA AZHAR 
   Bachelor of Science in Industrial and Systems Engineering 
   Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology 
   Daejeon, South Korea 
   2011 
 
 
   Submitted to the Faculty of the 
   Graduate College of the 
   Oklahoma State University 
   in partial fulfillment of 
   the requirements for 
   the Degree of 
      MASTER OF SCIENCE 
   December, 2013 
ii 
 
THE STUDY OF THE BULLWHIP EFFECT 
IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY  
 
 
   Thesis  Approved: 
 
   Dr. Tieming Liu 
 Thesis Adviser 
   Dr. Daniel Tilley 
 
Dr. Camille DeYong 
iii 
Acknowledgements reflect the views of the author and are not endorsed by committee members 




It would not have been possible to write this thesis without the help and support 
of the amazing people around me, to only some of whom it is possible to give particular 
mention here. 
 
Above all, I would like to thank Allah SWT for giving me the strength and 
blessings to complete this thesis.  
 
I would like to first show gratitude my advisor, Dr. Tieming Liu. For without his 
guidance and patience, this thesis would not have been possible.  I am eternally grateful 
to Dr. Daniel Tilley for believing in me with this project, showing encouragement and 
guidance while giving me the opportunity to pursue the project for my thesis. I am truly 
thankful to Dr. Camille DeYong for showing me amazing support and guidance 
throughout this thesis and in Alpha Pi Mu. 
 
I would like to thank my parents who have provided me guidance and emotional 
support throughout this study and in my life. They have supported me in pursuing 
knowledge as far as it will take me and I am forever blessed for that. I would like to thank 
my father, grandmother, sister and brother who have always been by my side and showed 
me love and encouragement. To Juan, I show my gratitude for the support, love and 
patience from the beginning and in pursuing my master’s degree. 
 
I would like to acknowledge the support of the New Product Development Center 
who has given me invaluable knowledge through real on-hands experience with problems 
in the industry. I am indebted to the department of Industrial Engineering and 
Management for facilitating my pursuance in knowledge and helping me shape my career 
path. I would like to thank Drs. Dalal, Glenn, Ingalls, Kamath, Kong, Pratt, and Swim for 




Name: MINA AZHAR   
 
Date of Degree: DECEMBER, 2013 
  
Title of Study: THE STUDY OF THE BULLWHIP EFFECT IN THE OIL AND GAS 
INDUSTRY 
 
Major Field: INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT  
 
Abstract: The New Product Development Center (NPDC) at Oklahoma State University 
(OSU) received problems reported by oil equipment suppliers. The specific problems the 
oil equipment suppliers experienced were frequent large labor adjustments due to large 
spikes in demand along with cyclic periods of high and low demand. When looking at 
data from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), it appeared that demand variability 
increased as it went up the supply chain in the oil and gas industry. From a supply chain 
management perspective, the specific problems reported by the oil equipment suppliers 
are similar to symptoms a company in an industry with the bullwhip effect present would 
experience. The investigation of this phenomenon used firm level data through a defined 
direct link of the levels in the oil and gas supply chain. Three research questions were 
posed: if the bullwhip exists in the oil and gas industry; if the highest level in the defined 
supply chain experiences the highest amount of demand variability; and if smaller sized 
companies are more susceptible to the bullwhip effect. The following results were found: 
most of the companies in the study and in the supply chain showed evidence of the 
bullwhip effect presence; the highest level in the supply chain did not appear to 
experience largest amount of demand variability; and the smaller companies 
demonstrated larger bullwhip effects. Other than the research questions, the study also 
provided evidence that: cyclicality was not widespread, but the largest demand was 
generally experienced by companies in the fourth quarter and lowest demand generally 
seen in the first quarter; larger integrated companies exhibited a lower bullwhip effect 
than smaller integrated companies; and the upstream level exhibited the largest bullwhip 
effect while the drilling and service and equipment level showed continuous 





TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter          Page 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................1 
 
1.1 Background ........................................................................................................1 
1.2 Statement of the Problem ...................................................................................1 
1.3 Introduction to the Bullwhip Effect ...................................................................2 
1.4 Scope and Methodology ....................................................................................3 
1.5 Hypotheses .........................................................................................................4 
 
 
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE....................................................................................6 
 
2.1 Studies on the Bullwhip Effect ..........................................................................6 
2.2 Studies on the Bullwhip Effect in the Oil and Gas Industry ..............................9 
2.3 Strategies to Counteract the Bullwhip Effect in the Oil and Gas Industry ......10 
 
 
III. ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................13 
 
3.1 Population and Sample ....................................................................................13 
 3.2 Design of the Investigation ..............................................................................15 
3.3 Analysis of the Bullwhip Effect in Individual Companies ..............................17 
 3.3.1 Downstream ............................................................................................18 
 3.3.2 Midstream ...............................................................................................24 
 3.3.3 Upstream .................................................................................................30 
 3.3.4 Drilling ....................................................................................................39 
 3.3.4 Service and Equipment ...........................................................................44 
3.4 Aggregate Analysis of Each Level in the Supply Chain..................................49 






Chapter          Page 
 
IV. FINDINGS .............................................................................................................55 
 
4.1 Research Questions ................................................................................................55 
 4.1.1 Research Question 1 ...............................................................................55 
 4.1.2 Research Question 2 ...............................................................................57 
 4.1.3 Research Question 3 ...............................................................................59 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................61 
 







LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table           Page 
    
Table 1. Two Different Bullwhip Effect Measurements.................................................................. 8 
Table 2. Description of Each Level of the Supply Chain .............................................................. 15 
Table 3. Research Questions and Hypotheses ............................................................................... 16 
Table 4. Classification of Small Business Standards According to Supply Chain Level .............. 17 
Table 5. Small and Large Companies ............................................................................................ 18 
Table 6. Data on Companies in the Downstream Level ................................................................ 19 
Table 7. Bullwhip Effect Ratios Before and After the Oil Crisis in the Downstream Level ......... 20 
Table 8. Data on Companies in the Midstream Level ................................................................... 24 
Table 9. Bullwhip Effect Values Before and After the Oil Crisis in the Midstream Level ........... 27 
Table 10. Data on Companies in the Upstream Level ................................................................... 30 
Table 11. Bullwhip Effect Values Before and After the Oil Crisis in the Upstream Level ........... 35 
Table 12. Data on Companies in the Drilling Level ...................................................................... 40 
Table 13. Bullwhip Effect Values Before and After the Oil Crisis in the Drilling Level .............. 41 
Table 14. Data on Companies in the Service and Equipment Level .............................................. 44 
Table 15. BE Ratios Before and After the Oil Crisis in the Service & Equipment Level ............. 46 
Table 16. Aggregate Data on Each Level ...................................................................................... 49 
Table 17. BE Ratio, C.V. of Demand and Production Comparison between Small and Large 
Companies in Each Level .............................................................................................................. 50 
Table 18. BE Ratio, C.V. of Demand and Production Before, During and After Oil Crisis 
Comparison of Each Level ............................................................................................................. 52 
Table 19. Ranking of Quarterly Demand ....................................................................................... 53 
Table 20. Comparison of Integrated Companies with the Decentralized Supply Chain ............... 54 
Table 21. Summary of companies in Each Level with BE ............................................................ 56 
Table 22. Average BE of Each Level ............................................................................................ 56 
Table 23. BE Ratios and C.V. of Demand of Each Level in the Supply Chain ............................. 57 
Table 24.  List of Split Service and Equipment Level Companies ................................................ 58 
Table 25. Comparison of Split S&E BE ratios with Their Respective Levels .............................. 59 
Table 26. BE Ratio, C.V. of Demand Comparison between Small and Large Companies in Each 





LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure           Page 
      
Figure 1. Oil and Gas Supply Chain ................................................................................................ 5 
Figure 2. Oil Price 1990-2012 ....................................................................................................... 14 
Figure 3. UGI Utilities Plotted Production and Demand ............................................................... 21 
Figure 4. AGL Resources, LP Plotted Production and Demand .................................................... 21 
Figure 5. Correlation between C.V. of Demand of Downstream Companies and BE Ratio ......... 22 
Figure 6. Correlation between Size of Downstream Companies and BE Ratio ............................. 22 
Figure 7. Correlation between Size of Downstream Companies and C.V. of Demand ................. 23 
Figure 8. Correlation between Size of Downstream Companies and C.V. of Production ............. 23 
Figure 9. UGI Corporation Plotted Production and Demand......................................................... 25 
Figure 10. Williams Companies, Inc. Plotted Production and Demand ........................................ 28 
Figure 11. Correlation between C.V. of Demand of Midstream Companies and BE Ratio .......... 28 
Figure 12.  Correlation between Size of Midstream Companies and BE Ratio ............................. 29 
Figure 13. Correlation between Size of Midstream Companies and C.V. of Demand .................. 29 
Figure 14. Correlation between Size of Midstream Companies and C.V. of Production .............. 30 
Figure 15. Devon Energy Plotted Production and Demand ........................................................... 33 
Figure 16. Ecopetrol Plotted Production and Demand .................................................................. 34 
Figure 17. Contango Oil & Gas Company Plotted Production and Demand................................. 34 
Figure 18. Correlation between C.V. of Demand of Upstream Companies and BE Ratio ............ 37 
Figure 19. Correlation between Size of Upstream Companies and BE Ratio ............................... 38 
Figure 20. Correlation between Size of Upstream Companies and C.V. of Demand .................... 38 
Figure 21. Correlation between Size of Upstream Companies and C.V. of Production ................ 39 
Figure 22. Helmerich & Payne, Inc. Plotted Production and Demand .......................................... 41 
Figure 23. Correlation between C.V. of Demand of Drilling Companies and BE Ratio ............... 42 
Figure 24. Correlation between Size of Drilling Companies and BE Ratio .................................. 42 
Figure 25. Correlation between Size of Drilling Companies and C.V. of Demand ....................... 42 
Figure 26. Correlation between Size of Drilling Companies and C.V. of Production ................... 43 
Figure 27. Schlumberger Plotted Production and Demand............................................................ 45 
Figure 28. Natural Gas Services Plotted Production and Demand ................................................ 46 
Figure 29. Correlation between C.V. of Demand of S&E Companies and BE Ratio .................... 48 
Figure 30. Correlation between Size of S&E Companies and BE Ratio ....................................... 48 
Figure 31. Correlation between Size of S&E Companies and C.V. of Demand ............................ 48 
Figure 32.  Correlation between Size of S&E Companies and C.V. of Production ....................... 49 
Figure 33. Questar Corporation Downstream Plotted Production and Demand ............................ 54 








The New Product Development Center (NPDC) at Oklahoma State University (OSU) 
received problems reported by oil equipment suppliers. The specific problems the oil equipment 
suppliers experienced were frequent large labor adjustments due to large spikes in demand along 
with cyclic periods of high and low demand. When looking at data from the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), it appeared that demand variability increased from downstream upwards the 
supply chain in the oil and gas industry. This behavior resembles that of a phenomenon known as 
the bullwhip effect. The bullwhip effect has been extensively studied in the retail industry. 
However, in the oil and gas industry, the behavior of the bullwhip effect has not been studied 
through a multiple level supply chain as it exists in the industry. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
From a supply chain management perspective, the specific problems reported by the oil 
equipment suppliers are similar to symptoms a company would experience, in an industry with 
the bullwhip effect present. Thus, the existence of the bullwhip effect and its impact on the 
companies in the oil and gas industry became the focus of the thesis. Investigation of this 
phenomenon in major levels of the oil and gas supply chain aimed to provide insight into the 
condition of the industry.  
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1.3 Introduction to the Bullwhip Effect 
The bullwhip effect in industry is described through the magnified variability in demand 
and production, originating from the retailer level and amplifying as it moves up the supply chain 
affecting the upper-most suppliers. This resembles the crack of the bullwhip; it starts with smaller 
amplitude and as it moves through the whip, the amplitude increases.  
The bullwhip effect was first analyzed by Forrester (1958) in his book “Industrial 
Dynamics” to create awareness for management on dynamic interactions in an industry. At that 
time it was known as the “Forrester Effect.” Later Lee, Padmanabhan, and Whang (1997a) 
defined the bullwhip effect as the amplification of demand from a downstream site to an upstream 
site. Chen and Lee (2012) then defined two different measurements to quantify the bullwhip 
effect: distortion of information flow and distortion of material flow.  The measurement used 
throughout the study to define the bullwhip effect was the distortion of material flow due to the 
practicality of using variance of production data instead of order data. Production data are readily 
available in company annual reports and orders are not.  
The bullwhip effect has been studied in single firms (Mack, 1953; Hammond, 1994; Lee, 
Padmanabhan, and Whang, 1997b; Holt, Modigliani, and Shelton, 1968; Terwiesch, Ren, Ho, and 
Cohen, 2005), whole industries (Anderson, Fine, and Parker, 2000; Blanchard, 1983; Zymelman, 
1965) and multiple industries (Miron and Zeldes, 1988; Cachon, Randall, and Schmidt, 2007; 
Bray and Mendelson, 2012). The majority of the papers studying the bullwhip effect specifically 
in the oil and gas industry mainly focused on testing different strategies to mitigate the bullwhip 
effect using simulation (Zhang and Zhang, 2013; Huang, Yan, and Guo, 2007; Shizeng, Zhen, 
and Xiaoyuan, 2006; Jacoby, 2010). The gap found in the literature was that the behavior of 
bullwhip effect has not been studied through a multiple level supply chain as it exists in the oil 
and gas industry. 
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1.4 Scope and Methodology 
 The purpose of this study was to develop a useful and thorough analysis of the bullwhip 
effect on the oil and gas industry from the publicly available data from companies traded on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).  
 Three selection criteria were made when selecting the companies for the study. First, the 
companies selected should provide publicly available data that go at least as far back as the first 
quarter of 2004. The pattern of the oil price, as well as the majority of the production and demand 
of the companies before 2004 was different from the patterns between 2004 and 2012. This also 
allowed the research to focus on the behavior before, during, and after the oil crisis in 2008. 
Second, these companies should be directly involved in the oil and gas industry, i.e., companies 
that drill, explore, gather, store and process oil and gas and those who offer services and 
equipment to companies. The third criteria for the companies selected was that they should not 
have merged, split, or have been acquired within the timeline of 2004-2012 as the significant 
change in production and demand would have been biased.  
 Using the data of the companies, the study first analyzed the individual companies. The 
companies were then aggregated according to the supply chain level in which they belonged, and 
each group was analyzed as a representative of the level in the supply chain. Each level was then 
aggregated and observed as a whole supply chain representative of the oil and gas industry. In 
each analysis, the study measured the following: 
1. Bullwhip Effect (BE) ratios as one value to see how the company/level behaved overall 
within 2004-2012 and in three different values to see how it behaved before, during, and 
after the oil crisis 
2. Coefficient of Variation (C.V.) in demand and production 
3. Cyclical patterns of production and demand, and  
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4. Size of firms. 
 The following formula was used throughout the study to verify the existence of the 
bullwhip effect: 
                    
                
 
among downstream, midstream, upstream, drilling and service and equipment companies. The 
bullwhip effect was said to exist if the value was larger than 1.  
1.5 Research Questions 
We sought to analyze three research questions in this study. The suppliers reported 
having experienced large, inconsistent demands from their customers, who are large players in 
the industry. Highly unpredictable production was a result. This is a symptom a company in an 
industry with a prominent existence of the bullwhip effect would experience. Therefore, the 
existence of the bullwhip effect was questioned in the oil and gas industry through the first 
research question. 
Research Question 1: Does the bullwhip effect exist in the oil and gas industry? 
Based on bullwhip effect theory, the higher the demand goes up the supply chain, the 
more variability the player at that level will experience (Figure 1). Since the suppliers in 
Oklahoma supply service and equipment are at the beginning of the oil and gas supply chain, it is 
expected for them to experience the highest amount of variability compared to the lower levels 





Research Question 2:  Does the service and equipment level exhibit the highest demand 
variability in the supply chain? 
Another observation this thesis aimed to analyze was if smaller sized companies were 
more susceptible to the bullwhip effect. Small companies have less capital and labor compared to 
large companies. Therefore, they have less capacity and tools to handle unpredictable situations. 
Small companies in the study were defined by NAICS‘s standard of small businesses based on 
the number of employees in the company. In addition, the companies that reported problems were 
smaller sized companies. This was stated as the third research question.  
Research Question 3: Are smaller sized companies more susceptible to larger demand variability 
than larger sized companies? 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Related literature is reviewed in Chapter 2. 
The design of the investigation, analysis of the supply chain in the oil and gas industry and 
analysis of individual companies is in Chapter 3. The results are then used to answer the research 
questions in Chapter 4.  Important conclusions on how this study will provide insight to 






















The research performed focused on the study of the bullwhip effect in the oil and gas 
industry. The literature reviewed in this chapter relates to existing studies on the bullwhip effect, 
specifically studies in the field of the oil and gas industry, and, compiled strategies that would 
seem fit for the companies that are experiencing the bullwhip effect at the top of the supply chain.  
2.1 Studies on the Bullwhip Effect 
The bullwhip effect was first discovered by Forrester (1958). He led the path by 
simulating decisions made by managers and thoroughly analyzing the dynamic interactions that 
exist in industries. He pointed out that the basic forms and policies an organization uses can cause 
undesirable time-varying behaviors in the supply chain. These varying behaviors were first 
known as the ‘Forrester Effect’ and are now named the bullwhip effect. Sterman (1989) simulated 
the supply chain with four players who make independent inventory decisions through his 
infamous “Beer Game.” He concluded that the bullwhip effect was caused by the players’ 
systematic irrational behavior. Both Forrester (1958) and Sterman (1989) observed the bullwhip 
effect through a controlled environment and focused on the behavior of the decision makers. 
Using the definition and characteristics of the bullwhip effect, many papers sought to 
investigate its behavior and existence in different industries through a single firm. Mack (1953) 
investigated it in the apparel industry; Hammond (1994) and Lee, et al. (1997b) investigated it in 
the food industry; Holt, et al. (1968) and Terwiesch, et al. (2005) in the electronics industry. 
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However, Bray and Mendelson (2012) mentioned several pitfalls with single firm studies; they 
might have bias to show positive bullwhip effect results since a bullwhip effect would be 
expected. 
There are studies that go beyond the behavior in single firms and focus on a whole 
industry. Blanchard (1983) investigated the automobile industry; Anderson et al. (2000) 
examined the machine tool industry through simulation; and Zymelman (1965) simulated how a 
policy would be able to reduce the amplitude of the goods cycle in the cotton textile industry.   
Several papers took the study further and observed multiple industries. Miron and Zeldes 
(1988) compared the food, tobacco, apparel, chemicals, petroleum and rubber industry. Cachon et 
al. (2007) examined the existence and strength of the bullwhip effect in various industries through 
access of industry-level U.S. data. Here, they categorized the companies into three levels of a 
supply chain: manufacturing, wholesale and retail industry level. Bray et al. (2012) also looked at 
the bullwhip effect across the entire U.S. economy but further refined Cachon et al. (2007) by 
observing firm level data instead of industry level data and using quarterly data instead of 
monthly, which was also done in this study. In all three papers stated above, the bullwhip effect 
was seen to positively exist in the petroleum industry. 
Several papers in the literature aimed to quantify the bullwhip effect and analyze its 
behavior in different settings. Papers including Chen and Lee (2012), Lee et al. (1997a) and 
Chen, Drezner, Ryan, and Simchi-Levi (2000) quantified the bullwhip effect as a ratio of 
variance of orders over variance of demand and stated that it existed if the value was larger than 
one. Chen and Lee (2012) categorized two different measures of the bullwhip effect: distortion of 
information flow and distortion of material flow. Distortion of information flow compared 
variance of orders with variance of demand while distortion of material flow compared variance 
of production over variance of demand. These formulas can be seen in Table 1. Papers modeling 
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different factors of the bullwhip effect, such as how it is related to supply chain costs and other 
implications, prefer using the information flow definition. The information flow measurement 
sees orders as input to the order-fulfillment process while the material flow measurement sees the 
outcome of it. However, for studies that investigate the bullwhip effect in multiple industries and 
firms, through annual reports or other forms of documentation, the material flow option is the 
more practical one since the companies do not show order data but production. Therefore, the 
material flow measurement was used throughout the study to measure the bullwhip effect. This 
measurement was also used in Cachon et al. (2007) and Bray and Mendelson (2012) where both 
papers quantified its orders as production through sales and inventory data. 
Table 1. Two Different Bullwhip Effect Measurements 
Distortion of Information Flow Distortion of Material Flow 
                
                
   
                    
                
   
 
Of literature available on the study of the bullwhip effect in multiple firms in the 
industry, Cachon et al. (2007) and Bray and Mendelson (2012) were most relevant to this study. 
Cachon et al. (2007) used two approaches to identify the bullwhip effect. First, they measured the 
existence in each industry then they analyzed if the bullwhip effect increased as it went up the 
levels of the defined supply chain. The three different levels were retail, wholesale and 
manufacturing. The amplification ratio for the manufacturing industry of the petroleum and coal 
industry was 3.86. Assuming this industry represents the Oklahoma oil and gas suppliers, this 
provided evidence that the bullwhip effect exists. Since Cachon et al. (2007) used industry-level 
data and did not explicitly link the levels of the supply chain directly; it made it difficult to find 
the source or pattern of the bullwhip. That is, whether it happens at the firm, or a certain level of 
the supply chain. 
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Bray and Mendelson (2012) extended Cachon et al. (2007)’s study by using quarterly and 
firm-level data instead of monthly and industry-level data and estimated the bullwhip at the level 
rather than through log differencing. Their study analyzed the phenomenon more extensively by 
testing for prevalence along with the existence of the bullwhip effect and decomposing the effect 
based on demand signal transmission lead times. The levels of the supply chain identified in their 
study were retail, wholesale, manufacturing and extraction. However, the oil and gas industry 
only fell in the manufacturing and extraction category, thus it was studied only on two levels. 
This thesis aimed to extend this study further, focusing on the oil and gas industry, by analyzing 
firm level data through a more direct link of the levels of the supply chain involved and in five 
levels of the supply chain. This thesis also aimed to include the investigation of the phenomenon 
in each firm and define any common or significant themes that exist. 
2.2 Studies on the Bullwhip Effect in the Oil and Gas Industry 
The previous papers mentioned only stated the bullwhip effect exists in the oil and gas 
industry but did not further investigate the phenomenon specifically in that industry. Miron and 
Zeldes (1988), using two different production measures defined by the Commerce Department 
and Federal Reserve Board, showed that the bullwhip effect for seasonal data was 2.73 and 7.91, 
respectively. Cachon et al. (2007) showed a ratio of 1.35 in wholesale and 2.95 in manufacturing 
for the petroleum industry. Since the oil and gas industry was briefly mentioned in the prevalent 
papers on the bullwhip effect, this section compiled those papers that studied the bullwhip effect 
explicitly in the oil and gas industry. 
The few papers found that specifically analyzed bullwhip effects in the oil and gas 
industry were categorized by simulation and non-simulation based papers. Papers that used 
simulation focused mainly on how the bullwhip effect was affected when certain strategies were 
used. Zhang and Zhang (2013) observed the bullwhip effect in the processed oil supply chain in 
10 
 
China using System Dynamic Analysis and Anaylogic Simulation Software. They found that 
delay was the main reason of the existence of the bullwhip effect and used Goal Programming 
and Analytical Hierarchy Process model to mitigate it. Huang et al. (2007) simulated H∞ method 
to reduce the bullwhip effect and analyzed how it behaved on multiple Chinese companies, 
including a petrochemical company. Jacoby (2010) simulated costs of the bullwhip effect in the 
industry when different oil prices were implemented. Shizheng et al. (2006) simulated a supply 
chain management based on a single petroleum company and quantified the bullwhip effect 
through warp wave quantifying. Sherhart (2013) did not use simulation and studied a specific 
problem where the bullwhip effect exists within British Petroleum. The papers that did study the 
oil and gas industry did not study the bullwhip effect in multiple levels of the supply chain as it 
existed in the industry which was done in this study.  
2.3 Strategies to Counteract the Bullwhip Effect in the Oil and Gas Industry 
Most of the strategies that exist on mitigating the bullwhip effect are to help industries 
that are characteristically different than the oil and gas industry. Problems such as order batching 
and price fluctuations due to discounts are not significant to the oil and gas products. Few papers 
provided strategies specifically to mitigate the bullwhip effect in the oil and gas industry and even 
fewer applied to an oil and gas company. 
 Multiple papers were found that analyzed different decision making models to mitigate 
the bullwhip effect in oil and gas companies. Zhang et al. (2000) used the Goal Programming 
model along with the Analytical Hierarchy Process model to provide a better model for the 
decision maker when analyzing a petrochemical complex. The Goal Programming model 
addresses multiple objectives of sustainability goals such as social, economic, resources and 
environmental. Conversely, the Analytical Hierarchy Process model evaluated the priorities of the 
goals and the weights of their decision variables. Huang et al. (2007) focused on applying an H∞ 
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method to reduce the bullwhip effect on petrochemical company. Sherhart (2013) used Theory of 
Constraints to mitigate the effect within British Petroleum. 
The remaining papers included for this section mostly emphasized the importance of 
coordination to increase efficiency of the supply chain and reduce the impact of the bullwhip 
effect. 
Jacoby (2010) studied the bullwhip effect in the oil and gas industry and suggested tightly 
coordinating demand and capacity activities for companies in the oil and gas industry. He stated 
that it can be done by sharing production, sales and inventory information with suppliers. It can 
also be done by sharing supply risk by indexing prices and using options and futures contracts. 
The last solution was for the player in the supply chain to share the risk of building new capacity 
to keep up with demand. These strategies could be used in all levels of this study’s defined supply 
chain but mostly among upstream, downstream, and midstream where the product is oil and gas. 
Bessant et al. (2003) surveyed six industries in UK that used supply chain learning (SCL) 
as a strategy. SCL points to the learning shared between a small number of firms that are close 
together in the supply process. In each industry there was a supply chain coordinator (SCC) that 
leads the program. Focusing on the oil and gas industry, the main objective sought in SCL was to 
have a comprehensive supply chain management program. When implementing the program, they 
established long-term contracts with contractors and all appropriate practices were addressed 
between the customer and supplier. They also established constant dialog between customer and 
suppliers; addressing day-to-day activities and moving focus to not only on material management 
but also on services. The benefits were savings of ₤1 billion; the first-tier supplier saved 5% of 
total costs and the second-tier supplier was helped by the first-tier supplier and was able to reduce 
lead time from 14 weeks to 16 days. This was done by committing to share information, 
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establishing measurement systems to capture visible results and setting up co-operative ideas to 
improve the supply chain.  
Longwell (2002), a former director and executive vice president of Exxon Mobil 
Corporation, mentioned the biggest challenge in the oil and gas industry was keeping up with 
demand. He stated that this was due to a decreasing supply and an increasing demand that was 
seen throughout the years. To tackle this problem, Exxon Mobil developed partnerships that gave 
mutual benefits with the government. Exxon Mobil also worked out reasonable tax and fiscal 
regimes that recognize long lead times and risks involved in what they do. He stated that 
maintaining these partnerships will be the key to their success. 
 The following papers still focus on coordination but are more applicable for the suppliers 
of the service and equipment level and the drilling level since manufacturing was the main way of 
production. Anderson et al. (2000) studied an industry that was most similar to the service and 
equipment level in this study’s supply chain, which was the machine tool industry. They observed 
similar fluctuations in demand and cyclical workforce level due to keeping up with those 
fluctuations. For the machine tool industry, they suggested that the suppliers take the lead in 
creating a better relationship with their customers. This was meant to initiate learning from each 
other. The machine tool users get the most from their equipment and the suppliers have advance 
knowledge of their customer’s needs and greater stability as they discuss policies in reducing 
supplier volatility. Bray and Mendelson (2012) summarize best practices of Caterpillar from 
several papers. They focused on working with the suppliers by promising not to change the 
amount of their order within a three month period and reducing long lead times by sharing their 
order forecasts. They required written statements from their suppliers on how they plan to 








3.1 Population and Sample 
The population for this study consists of all companies that are involved in the oil and gas 
industry. Their business includes providing drilling services, exploration, and gathering, storing 
and processing oil and gas. The population also includes companies who provide services and 
equipment to support these activities. The sample was obtained from companies listed in the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE). This was deemed a good representation since NYSE is the 
world’s largest stock exchange by market capitalization. 
This sample was further narrowed down to companies that had publicly available data as 
of the first quarter of 2004.  The pattern of the oil price before 2003 and after 2003 was 
considerably different. From 1990 to 2003, prices stayed around 20$/barrel. After 2003, prices 
increased substantially. However, in 2003 multiple events occurred (loss of production capacity 
in Iraq and Venezuela and increased OPEC production (Williams, 2013)), which made it a 
momentous period on its own. Since this study includes analysis of how the companies behaved 
before and after the oil crisis in 2008, it would be harder to conclude the behavior before 2008 if 
other large events were present without further analysis. Therefore the sample only includes 
companies’ data from 2004 to 2012. The study did not include companies that have been 
acquired, merged or split into multiple independent companies to avoid bias in significant change 
in production and demand. 
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Figure 2. Oil Price 1990-2012 
The pattern of the oil price can be seen in Figure 2. The oil prices used were obtained 
from the database of U.S. Energy Information Administration. The crude oil domestic first 
purchase price was used for the oil price since this price is associated with the physical and 
financial transfer of domestic crude oil off the property on which it was produced making it 
directly related to the supply chain. 
It is a common practice for studies to adjust seasonality in the data. However this study 
did not adjust for seasonality for two reasons: (1) EconMatters (2013) stated that oil and gas is a 
highly seasonal product hence additional adjustments on data would prevent observation in its 
actual state and; (2) in multiple studies, it has been proven that any analysis of 
production/inventory behavior excluding seasonality would fail to exploit most of the variation in 
the data which was mostly there due to the seasonal fluctuations existing in the data. For example, 
Miron and Zeldes (1988) found that seasonal variation accounts for more than half of the total 
variation in the data, Ghali (1987) found that seasonal adjustment of the data was an important 
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alter production rates differently depending on the seasonal and non-seasonal variations in 
demand. Therefore, analyzing data “as is” with its seasonality will best represent the industry. 
3.2 Design of Investigation 
The companies gathered from the NYSE database were categorized according to the most 
appropriate supply chain level in terms of their business. The companies were then analyzed for 
the bullwhip effect individually and aggregately in each level of the supply chain. Both analyses 
will include quarterly analysis and differentiation before and after 2008 to find any common 
behaviors. 
The supply chain was structured into five separate levels: Service and Equipment, 
Drilling, Upstream, Midstream, and Downstream. To accurately categorize the companies 
correctly, the purpose of each level of the supply chain is defined in Table 2: 
Table 2. Description of Each Level of the Supply Chain 
Supply Chain Level Description 
  Provides service/solutions and equipment 
 Supplies the Drilling level with its solutions and equipment to help 
in obtaining the oil and gas 
 
 Provides drill rig equipment  and services 





 Explores and produces oil and gas 





 Gathers, stores and transports oil and gas 
 Supplies the Downstream level through service of transporting and 
storing oil and gas 
 
 Refines and processes crude oil and natural gas 
 Sells and distributes the processed oil and gas to consumers 
 
















The supply chain was designed in order to best capture direct flow of material from 
upstream to downstream levels in the oil and gas industry. In reality, not all companies supply 
just one level in this defined supply chain. When analyzing the companies in the service and 
equipment level, it appeared that most of the companies provided solutions and equipment to 
various levels of the supply chain. For example, Schlumberger offers real-time software services 
to increase drilling efficiencies which relates to the drilling level, but also offers software and 
services to optimize oil and gas production relating to the upstream level while offering chemicals 
to support maximum production flowing through pipelines for the Midstream level. The service 
and equipment level will be analyzed with the level it mostly directly supplies in chapter four. 
However, throughout the study, the companies are categorized to the most appropriate level 
according to the largest revenue from their offerings to a certain level compared to their offerings 
to other levels. 
The research questions addressed in this thesis are summarized in Table 3: 










Does the service and equipment level exhibit the highest demand variability 





Are smaller sized companies more susceptible to larger demand variability 





3.3 Analysis of Individual Companies 
This section analyzed each individual company in terms of their behavior in production 
and demand from 2004 to 2012. The companies in the sample were first categorized according to 
their sizes: small or large. GPO (2013) states the size standards and based the standards on the 
number of employees or annual receipts in millions of dollars. NAICS specified definitions for 
small companies based on specific industries; the study grouped some of these industries to 
represent the appropriate level of the supply chain defined in the study. The definitions for each 
level were applied to each company in the level. Companies larger than the standards were 
considered large companies. For simplicity, the sizes of the companies were classified based on 
the number of employees. This was done to answer the third research question. These 
classifications are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Classification of Small Business Standards According to Supply Chain Level 




(millions of dollars) 
Number of 
Employees 
Oil and Gas Field Machinery and 
Equipment Manufacturing Service and 
Equipment 
- 500 
Support Activities for Oil and Gas 
Operations 
35.50 - 
Drilling Oil and Gas Wells Drilling - 500 
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Extraction Upstream 
- 500 
Natural Gas Liquid Extraction - 500 
Pipeline Transportation of Crude Oil 
Midstream 
- 1,500 
Pipeline Transportation of Natural Gas 25.50 - 










From the definitions of Table 4, the following numbers of small and large companies 
were found in each level as indicated in Table 5. 





Drilling Upstream Midstream Downstream Total 
Small 
Companies 
2 - 28 6 2 38 
Large 
Companies 
16 7 23 10 9 65 
Total 18 7 51 16 11 103 
 
When analyzing the individual companies multiple factors were considered in addition to 
the BE. First, the C.V. of demand was calculated for each company to see if the demand was 
highly variable.  Second, the study looked at the plots of production and demand across time from 
2004 to 2012 to see the behavior of the companies in that time period. The graphs were further 
examined to see if any cyclical patterns were present in the industry through observation of 
obvious up and downs in production and demand in each company. Companies were said to have 
cyclical patterns if repetitive increase and decrease of production/demand was seen in any of the 
three time periods: before, during and after the oil crisis. Third, a separate analysis of behavior 
around the crisis was done from evaluating the bullwhip effect before, while, and after the oil 
crisis in 2008. 
3.3.1 Downstream 
Eleven companies were categorized in the downstream level. The categorization of the 


















Valero 21,329 Large 1.12 0.33 Non-cyclic 
AmeriGas 6,317 Large 2.63 0.36 Cyclic 
Tesoro  4,949 Large 1.18 0.34 Non-cyclic 
Atmos Energy 4,320 Large 1.26 0.49 Cyclic 
AGL Resources  3,340 Large 1.01 0.57 Cyclic 
Southwest Gas  2,430 Large 1.50 0.55 Cyclic 
WGL Holdings 1,582 Large 0.72 0.77 Cyclic 
World Fuel 
Service 
1,313 Large 1.04 0.64 Non-cyclic 
UGI Utilities 1,275 Large 0.22 0.91 Cyclic 
South Jersey Gas  434 Small 0.81 0.63 Cyclic 
Delta Gas  154 Small 0.66 0.61 Cyclic 
 
The small companies in the sample, South Jersey Gas and Delta Gas, did not exhibit the 
bullwhip effect; 0.81 and 0.66, respectively. The large companies in this level exhibited the 
bullwhip effect having ratios above 1 except for WGL Holdings and UGI Utilities, which did not 
exhibit the effect. This was deemed reasonable since the downstream level is at the lowest level 
of the supply chain, thus closest to the market so the demands they experience are expected to be 
relatively constant. 
When examining the C.V. of demand, the five smallest companies have the highest 
coefficients and the largest four companies have the lowest coefficients.  This indicates that the 
smaller companies in the downstream level exhibit a more volatile demand than that by the larger 
companies. However, since they did not exhibit high bullwhip effect ratios, it appears that they 
were more capable of keeping up with the high volatility in demand. 
20 
 
Looking at the graphs of plotted production and demand of each company at the 
downstream level, it appeared that the amount of cyclicality a company experiences in production 
and demand does not reflect the magnitude of their bullwhip effect ratio. Eight companies in this 
level appeared to have cyclical production and demand. Five out of eight of the companies in the 
sample that had cyclical patterns were the ones with the lowest bullwhip effect ratios of the 
sample. UGI Utilities had the lowest bullwhip effect value in the sample, 0.22, yet cyclicality was 
evident. Figure 3 plots the production and demand of UGI Utilities along with the oil price to 
align the oil crisis along with the production and demand the company experienced at that time. It 
appears that UGI Utilities had repetitive ups and downs in production and demand, except in 
2007 and 2008 where demand spikes much higher than production. The plotted graphs for each 
company in the downstream level can be seen in Appendix 1.  
When observing the behavior of the companies at the downstream level at the time of the 
crisis, any obvious deviations on the plotted production and demand graphs of each company and 
any noticeable bullwhip effect values around 2008 were recorded. From Table 7, the middle 
column, 2007-2009 BE, did not show any noteworthy large values during the crisis.  
Table 7. Bullwhip Effect Ratios Before and After the Oil Crisis in the Downstream Level 
 
Company 2004-2006  BE 2007-2009   BE 2010-2012   BE 
Valero 1.47 1.11 1.21 
AmeriGas 2.28 2.15 3.16 
Tesoro 1.26 0.94 1.18 
Atmos Energy 1.40 1.03 1.67 
AGL Resources 1.01 0.46 1.31 
Southwest Gas 1.80 1.35 2.06 
WGL Holdings 0.84 0.48 0.97 
World Fuel Service 1.03 1.00 1.03 
UGI Utilities 0.86 0.09 0.74 
South Jersey Gas 0.65 0.69 1.65 
Delta Gas 0.56 0.57 0.99 
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However, there were companies with considerably lower values during the oil crisis such 
as UGI Utilities and AGL Resources. UGI Utilities experienced two large spikes in demand 
whereas production did not reach close as high indicated in Figure 3.  
Figure 3. UGI Utilities Plotted Production and Demand 
Figure 4 indicates that AGL Resource’s production and demand pattern were cyclical. 
However, during the oil crisis, production did not decrease as much as demand. Thus, causing the 
company to have a lower bullwhip effect at that time period.  
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In the downstream level, only the small companies had an increasing value from 2004 to 
2012. The large companies exhibited a dip of the BE ratio during the crisis but increased again 
afterwards. 
Relationships between the size of the company, the bullwhip effect, and the variability of 
the production and the demand are shown in Figures 5 through 8. Figure 5 provides evidence that 
companies with larger demand variability incur smaller bullwhip effect. This is because the 
production capacities are usually limited and difficult to adjust. If the demand variability is 
already high, the company has to do some smoothing in its production schedules. 
Figure 5. Correlation between C.V. of Demand of Downstream Companies and BE Ratio 
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Average number of Employees 
Correlation between Size and BE Ratio 
Downstream 
ρ = -0.706 
ρ = 0.784 
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Figure 7 shows smaller companies have larger demand variability. This is because small 
companies typically have small demand so the same level of variation will result in larger C.V. of 
demand for small companies than for large ones. However, Figure 8 indicates that the variability 
in production is indifferent to the average number of employees. 
Figure 7. Correlation between Size of Downstream Companies and C.V. of Demand 
Figure 8. Correlation between Size of Downstream Companies and C.V. of Production 
To summarize the analysis of the companies in the downstream level, in general, the 
bullwhip effect ratio was seen larger in larger sized companies. This can be seen in the increasing 
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Average number of Employees 
Correlation between Size and C.V. of Production  
Downstream 
ρ = -0.756 
ρ = -0.128 
24 
 
of them showed cyclic production and demand patterns. The smaller companies were more 
susceptible to the oil crisis in 2008. 
3.3.2 Midstream 
Sixteen companies were categorized in the midstream level. The categorization of the 
companies in this level can be seen in Table 8. 
Table 8. Data on Companies in the Midstream Level 











Sempra Energy 14,563 Large 1.40 0.31 Non-cyclic 
Kinder Morgan, Inc. 8,159 Large 0.59 0.88 Non-cyclic 
UGI Corporation 6,317 Large 1.72 0.36 Cyclic 
Enbridge Energy 
Partners, LP 
5,922 Large 1.14 0.28 Non-cyclic 
Williams 
Companies, Inc. 
4,407 Large 2.59 0.28 Non-cyclic 
TransCanada 
Corporation 
3,581 Large 1.77 0.20 Non-cyclic 
Enterprise Products 
Partners, LP 
3,248 Large 1.16 0.55 Non-cyclic 
Plains All American 
Pipeline, LP 
3,184 Large 1.11 0.29 Non-cyclic 
Inergy, LP 2,492 Large 1.64 0.44 Cyclic 
ONEOK Partners, 
LP 
1,856 Large 1.12 0.62 Non-cyclic 
Magellan Midstream 
Partners, LP 
1,167 Small 2.50 0.31 Non-cyclic 
Buckeye Partners, 
LP 
899 Small 1.09 0.98 Non-cyclic 
Martin Midstream 
Partners, LP 
585 Small 1.47 0.53 Non-cyclic 
Crosstex Energy. LP 563 Small 1.02 0.51 Non-cyclic 
Atlas Pipeline 
Partners, LP 
316 Small 1.69 0.59 Non-cyclic 




Magellan Midstream Partners, a small company, appeared to have the second largest 
bullwhip effect ratio, 2.50. In contrast, the second largest company, Kinder Morgan, did not 
exhibit the bullwhip effect. It is not representative enough to answer the third research question, 
based on these two companies alone, since the largest company, which almost twice the size in 
number of employees, has a bullwhip effect of 1.40.  
With one of the lowest BE ratios, Kinder Morgan showed one of the highest variability of 
demand. Based on data, it appears that Kinder Morgan has been able to keep up with demand 
despite its high volatility. Magellan Midstream Partners, exhibited one of the largest BE ratios but 
showed low coefficient of variation of demand compared to the others. This provides evidence 
that they have volatile production and have not sufficiently kept up with demand.  
Cyclicality of production and demand is only seen when plotting UGI Corporation and 
Inergy. In relation to their bullwhip effect ratios, UGI Corporation exhibited a ratio of 1.72 
whereas Inergy showed a ratio of 1.64. Figure 9 shows the level of cyclicality experienced by 
UGI Corporation. It is shown that production would peak along with its demand, almost 
consistently, every first quarter and reach its low point every third quarter.  
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Looking at plotted production and demand at the midstream level, five companies were 
seen to have large deviations during the crisis. These include Magellan Midstream Partners, 
Buckeye Partners, Sempra Energy, UGI Corporation and TransCanada Corporation. The plotted 
graphs for each company in the downstream level can be seen in Appendix 2. 
Table 9 indicates a steady pattern, a decreasing trending pattern, and a low and a high 
bullwhip effect value around the oil crisis. Enbridge Energy Partners, Plains All American, and 
ONEOK Partners had a BE that was stable around 1.00 before, during, and after the crisis. 
Despite the data indicating that they had a bullwhip effect present, with a value over 1, they had 
been able to keep the value consistent, and were not affected by the crisis. There were two 
companies that showed to have a decreasing trend from 2004 ending with no bullwhip effect in 
2012. They are Buckeye Partners and PVR Partners. Buckeye Partners showed high amplification 
leading up to the crisis; however, it decreased during the crisis.  PVR Partners does not show it 
was largely affected during the crisis since the amplification decreased only by 0.01 but then 
decreased by 0.64 afterwards. The strategy used by these companies may provide insight on how 










 Table 9. Bullwhip Effect Values Before and After the Oil Crisis in the Midstream Level 
Company 2004-2006  BE 2007-2009   BE 2010-2012   BE 
Sempra Energy 2.36 1.33 2.07 
Kinder Morgan, Inc. 1.19 0.18 2.87 
UGI Corporation 1.47 1.37 2.04 
Enbridge Energy 
Partners, LP 
0.99 1.03 1.03 
Williams Companies, 
Inc. 
1.44 6.32 1.41 
TransCanada 
Corporation 
1.62 1.21 3.73 
Enterprise Products 
Partners, LP 
1.27 1.13 1.10 
Plains All American 
Pipeline, LP 
1.02 1.09 1.11 
Inergy, LP 1.49 1.56 1.37 
ONEOK Partners, LP 1.15 1.14 1.16 
Magellan Midstream 
Partners, LP 
1.35 1.20 3.25 
Buckeye Partners, LP 4.27 1.40 0.88 
Martin Midstream 
Partners, LP 
1.27 1.48 1.20 
Crosstex Energy. LP 1.15 1.05 1.01 
Atlas Pipeline 
Partners, LP 
1.46 2.43 1.42 
PVR Partners, LP 1.25 1.24 0.60 
 
Kinder Morgan, UGI Corp., TransCanada Corporation and Magellan Midstream show 
low bullwhip effect ratio during the crisis, while Williams Companies, Inergy and Atlas Pipeline 
Partners shows high bullwhip effect ratio. Kinder Morgan exhibited a spike in demand within the 
second and third quarter in 2008. Figure 10 indicates Williams Companies had a large gap 
between production and demand during the oil crisis, increasing in 2008 then decreasing in 2009. 




Figure 10. Williams Companies, Inc. Plotted Production and Demand 
Relationship between the size of the company, the bullwhip effect it exhibits and the 
variability of production and demand it experiences is shown in Figures 11 to 14. Figure 11 
shows that high bullwhip effect ratios relate to lower demand variability. One cannot conclude 
from Figure 12 that smaller companies exhibit larger bullwhip effect.  















































Williams Companies, Inc. 
















C.V. of Demand  
Correlation between C.V. of Demand and 
BE Midstream 
ρ = -0.570 
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Figure 12.  Correlation between Size of Midstream Companies and BE Ratio 
Figure 13 and 14, indicates that the smaller companies exhibit higher variability in 
production and demand. This is because small companies typically have small demand. The same 
level of variation will result in larger C.V. for small companies than for large ones. 
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Correlation between Size and C.V. of Demand 
 Midstream 
ρ = -0.585 
ρ = 0.191 
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Figure 14. Correlation between Size of Midstream Companies and C.V. of Production 
To summarize the analysis of the companies in the midstream level, there was not much 
that could be concluded from the bullwhip effect, in terms of the size of the company. Both the 
largest and smallest BE ratios were seen in the group of large companies. In dealing with the oil 
crisis, the BE ratio appeared to increase during the crisis both in small and large companies. 
Cyclicality in production and demand were seen only in the large companies. 
3.3.3 Upstream 
For the upstream level, 51 companies were analyzed. The categorization of the 
companies along with relevant data is listed in Table 10.  Based on the NAICS standards, there 
are 28 small companies and 23 large companies in the upstream sample. 
Table 10. Data on Companies in the Upstream Level 












Occidental Petroleum 9,814 Large 4.70 0.24 Non-cyclic 
Chesapeake Energy 7,345 Large 164.75 0.47 Non-cyclic 
Ecopetrol 6,301 Large 3.34 0.73 Cyclic 
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Correlation between Size and C.V. of Production  
Midstream  
ρ = -0.603 
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Encana Corporation 4,565 Large 3.27 0.64 Non-cyclic 
Andarko Petroleum 
Corporation 
4,311 Large 6.77 0.52 Non-cyclic 
Canadian Natural Resources 3,894 Large 3.09 0.42 Non-cyclic 
Apache Corporation 3,882 Large 0.74 0.68 Non-cyclic 
Pioneer Natural Resources 2,167 Large 2.05 0.45 Non-cyclic 
Unit Corporation 2,101 Large 6.02 0.28 Non-cyclic 
EOG Resources 1,968 Large 3.63 0.84 Non-cyclic 
EQT Corporation 1,610 Large 0.75 0.55 Cyclic 
Southwestern Energy 1,561 Large 10.38 0.51 Non-cyclic 
Energen Resources 
Corporation 
1,527 Large 2.79 0.31 Cyclic 
Noble Energy, Inc. 1,490 Large 16.59 0.33 Non-cyclic 
Newfield Exploration 
Company 
1,129 Large 5.23 0.47 Non-cyclic 
Denbury Resources 854 Large 10.41 0.60 Non-cyclic 
QEP Resources, Inc. 761 Large 2.02 0.57 Cyclic 
Cimarex Energy 731 Large 56.80 0.25 Non-cyclic 
Range Resources 
Corporation 
710 Large 50.11 0.32 Non-cyclic 
Exco Resources 710 Large 24.67 0.59 Non-cyclic 
Enerplus 675 Large 48.53 0.19 Non-cyclic 
SM Energy 489 Small 11.07 0.36 Non-cyclic 
Whiting Petroleum 
Corporation 
476 Small 18.20 0.51 Non-cyclic 
Quicksilver Resources 473 Small 4.97 0.59 Non-cyclic 
Markwest Energy Partners 469 Small 7.29 0.33 Non-cyclic 
Cabot Oil and Gas 
Corporation 
431 Small 22.71 0.22 Non-cyclic 
Swift Energy Company 317 Small 46.59 0.33 Non-cyclic 
Stone Energy Corporation 294 Small 7.94 0.32 Non-cyclic 
Vermillion Energy, Inc. 290 Small 34.41 0.34 Non-cyclic 
PDC Energy, Inc 279 Small 3.36 0.29 Non-cyclic 
Clayton Williams Energy, 
Inc. 
275 Small 4.57 0.51 Non-cyclic 
Berry Petroleum Company 264 Small 14.29 0.38 Non-cyclic 
Penn Virginia Corporation 245 Small 0.18 0.69 Non-cyclic 
EPL Oil & Gas, Inc. 145 Small 7.17 0.41 Non-cyclic 
Baytex Energy Corporation 138 Small 4.16 0.5 Non-cyclic 
Comstock Resources 118 Small 7.45 0.52 Cyclic 
Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc. 106 Small 86.40 0.45 Non-cyclic 
Goodrich Petroleum 97 Small 8.84 0.44 Non-cyclic 
McMoran Exploration 92 Small 8.60 0.28 Non-cyclic 
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PetroQuest Energy 89 Small 35.19 0.32 Non-cyclic 
Callon Petroleum 84 Small 84.47 0.22 Non-cyclic 
Ultra Petroleum 84 Small 11.66 0.47 Non-cyclic 
Gulfport Energy 
Corporation 
69 Small 130.73 0.43 Non-cyclic 
Abraxas Petroleum 
Corporation 
69 Small 8.15 0.40 Non-cyclic 
Endeavour International 
Corporation 
63 Small 24.04 0.80 Non-cyclic 
Crimson Exploration, Inc. 57 Small 26.72 0.73 Non-cyclic 
Warren Resources, Inc. 56 Small 21.68 0.35 Non-cyclic 
Tengasco, Inc. 27 Small 13.35 0.31 Non-cyclic 
Apco Oil & Gas 
International, Inc. 
19 Small 6.42 0.60 Non-cyclic 
Contango Oil & Gas 
Company 
7 Small 5.52 1.40 Cyclic 
 
The last fourteen companies in the list were companies with number of employees less 
than 110. It was seen that from this small group, a combined average bullwhip effect of 33.71 was 
obtained. This is considerably larger compared to the 14 largest companies in the level which had 
an average BE ratio of 18.36. In fact, the largest three bullwhip effect values in the upstream 
sample were seen in this group. Gulfport Energy Corporation, Carrizo Oil and Gas and Callon 
Petroleum had bullwhip effect values of 130.73, 86.4, and 84.47, respectively.  
Examining the larger sized companies of the sample, 12 out of 14 companies had 
bullwhip effect values smaller than seven. This is considerably small compared to the values of 
the rest of the sample. Chesapeake Energy exhibited the largest bullwhip effect from the top 14 
largest companies with a value of 164.75. When looking at Devon Energy, the second largest 
bullwhip effect in the first largest 14 companies, its coefficient of variation in demand was 0.2. 
This provided evidence that they generated more variability than the demand they receive. This 
can be corroborated with the high production seen in their plotted production and demand seen in 
Figure 15.  
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Figure 15. Devon Energy Plotted Production and Demand 
At this level, production and demand were not as cyclical when looking at the individual 
companies. The large companies tend to be more cyclical, this was seen from two small 
companies and four large companies who had cyclical production and demand. When comparing 
the largest cyclic company, Ecopetrol, with the smallest cyclic company, Contango Oil & Gas 
Company, it is obvious that the larger company would be able to handle the more predictable 
production and demand. Contango became cyclical after the oil crisis but in unforeseeable 
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Figure 16. Ecopetrol Plotted Production and Demand 
Figure 17. Contango Oil & Gas Company Plotted Production and Demand 
Looking at the bullwhip effect values of the companies in the upstream level before, 
during and after the oil crisis in Table 11, multiple noteworthy occurrences were shown. Twenty 
two companies showed a considerably large increase of the bullwhip effect during the oil crisis, 
10 companies continuously exhibit increasing bullwhip effect in each time period; 12 showed 
decreasing bullwhip effect ratio; and six had lower bullwhip effect ratios during the oil crisis but 
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Table 11. Bullwhip Effect Values Before and After the Oil Crisis in the Upstream Level 
Company 2004-2006  BE 2007-2009   BE 2010-2012   BE 
Occidental Petroleum 1.84 18.52 3.42 
Chesapeake Energy 196.81 2933.16 123.86 
Ecopetrol 2.29 3.06 3.26 
Devon Energy 123.66 70.28 64.39 
Encana Corporation 7.92 5.04 171.93 
Andarko Petroleum 
Corporation 
19.74 40.55 1.89 
Canadian Natural Resources 2.28 32.67 7.23 
Apache Corporation 4.03 0.15 1.16 
Pioneer Natural Resources 5.26 4.86 1.08 
Unit Corporation 7.79 7.03 4.13 
EOG Resources 36.47 25.79 3.75 
EQT Corporation 0.24 0.55 1.92 
Southwestern Energy 3.99 8.00 9.07 
Energen Resources 
Corporation 
2.07 1.56 2.99 
Noble Energy, Inc. 18.79 72.31 11.69 
Newfield Exploration 
Company 
3.84 83.16 3.42 
Denbury Resources 8.58 48.83 12.05 
QEP Resources, Inc. 3.43 1.97 1.03 
Cimarex Energy 34.77 294.49 14.33 
Range Resources Corporation 19.60 69.80 233.24 
Exco Resources 19.14 30.76 24.14 
Enerplus 55.81 212.08 8.41 
SM Energy 10.66 63.52 10.75 
Whiting Petroleum 
Corporation 
11.12 64.75 6.31 
Quicksilver Resources 25.33 24.46 3.12 
Markwest Energy Partners 2.37 3.77 3.44 
Cabot Oil and Gas Corporation 11.10 15.07 14.95 
Swift Energy Company 179.06 171.88 24.31 
Stone Energy Corporation 3.08 6.95 13.03 
Vermillion Energy, Inc. 37.80 84.74 150.44 
PDC Energy, Inc 1.22 5.04 4.22 
Clayton Williams Energy, Inc. 5.60 3.35 3.11 
Berry Petroleum Company 31.92 23.69 10.46 
Penn Virginia Corporation 0.09 1.09 1.21 
EPL Oil & Gas, Inc. 4.14 7.53 11.12 
Baytex Energy Corporation 38.25 8.39 2.63 
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Comstock Resources 7.26 19.20 0.77 
Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc. 15.34 66.68 320.24 
Goodrich Petroleum 3.07 29.77 2.28 
McMoran Exploration 4.01 19.53 1.32 
PetroQuest Energy 16.87 39.24 10.47 
Callon Petroleum 121.90 117.64 13.80 
Ultra Petroleum 31.65 20.06 101.32 
Gulfport Energy Corporation 68.18 23.74 294.09 
Abraxas Petroleum 
Corporation 
36.63 15.21 3.90 
Endeavour International 
Corporation 
21.38 81.67 10.46 
Crimson Exploration, Inc. 8.53 14.92 8.40 
Warren Resources, Inc. 6.58 21.98 12.26 
Tengasco, Inc. 20.41 28.94 31.56 
Apco Oil & Gas International, 
Inc. 
39.12 1.79 5.45 
Contango Oil & Gas Company 2.09 17.14 0.39 
 
The six companies that had lower bullwhip effect ratios during the oil crisis but then 
increased considerably afterwards behaved in a similar way in their respective plotted production 
and demand graphs. The dip of the ratio during the crisis was due to a peak reaction in both 
production and demand. However, after the crisis was over, the companies had an increase in 
their production. The increase was steep and volatile while demand was relatively stable.  
Chesapeake Energy exhibited the largest bullwhip effect during the crisis. This can be explained 
from their stable demand throughout that period; however, production was volatile. In 2008, 
specifically, the second quarter exhibited a negative production of around 1.6 billion and would 
have 6.5 billion in production by the third quarter. 
Based on Table 11, it appeared to show that there were companies that were more 
commendable than others in achieving a reduction the presence of the bullwhip effect after the 
crisis. These companies were Comstock Resources and Contango Oil and Gas. This was notable 
since Comstock and Contango were some of the smallest companies in the sample. The strategies 
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used by these companies to reduce the bullwhip effect would be a good example for both small 
and large companies in the upstream level. 
The most common pattern seen in this level was the large surge of the bullwhip effect 
value during the crisis. When comparing the plotted production and demand of the 22 companies 
that exhibited these patterns, the same behavior was seen. All increased their production steeply 
at the beginning of the crisis and then plunged after the crisis was over, even though demand was 
not exhibiting the same behavior in the same level. The behavior was not different when 
compared in relation to the size of the companies.  
Relationship between the size of the company, the bullwhip effect it exhibits and the 
variability of production and demand it experiences is shown in Figures 18 to 21. Figures 18 and 
19 showed that larger companies exhibit higher bullwhip effect and face lower demand 
variability. They have a more stable demand yet they pass on their variability of production, 
resulting in a large bullwhip effect up the chain.  
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Figure 19. Correlation between Size of Upstream Companies and BE Ratio 
Based on Figures 20 and 21 it cannot be concluded that the size of the company relates to 
the amount variability in demand and production. 
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Figure 21. Correlation between Size of Upstream Companies and C.V. of Production 
To summarize the analysis of the companies in the upstream level in terms of the 
bullwhip effect, the smallest companies were seen to have larger bullwhip effect ratios with one 
exception, Penn Virigina, but it had relatively high C.V. of demand. Larger companies were seen 
to have smaller ratios with one exception, Devon Energy, which had a relatively low C.V. of 
demand. This provides evidence that in the upstream level, smaller companies are more 
susceptible to the bullwhip effect compared to the larger companies, helping answer the third 
research question.   
3.3.4 Drilling 
Six companies were observed in the drilling level. The categorization of the companies in 
this level along with the relevant data is shown in Table 12.  All the companies in the sample 
were considered large based on the NAICS standards. In this level, the bullwhip effect is present 
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23,761 Large 2.45 0.34 Non-cyclic 
Transocean Ltd. 16,228 Large 2.69 0.49 Non-cyclic 
Patterson-UTI 
Energy, Inc. 
7,311 Large 3.33 0.38 Non-cyclic 
Noble Corporation 5,778 Large 6.15 0.34 Non-cyclic 
Helmerich & 
Payne, Inc. 
5,405 Large 3.41 0.46 Non-cyclic 
Ensco plc 4,840 Large 3.95 0.60 Non-cyclic 
Rowan Companies 4,646 Large 4.60 0.32 Non-cyclic 
 
It can be seen that the largest company in the sample does have the smallest bullwhip 
effect value. However, nothing conclusive could be obtained from the data in relation to the size 
of the company with the amount of bullwhip effect a company would exhibit. 
No plotted graph showed obvious cyclicality. As noted in Figure 22 Helmerich & Payne 
appeared to experience cyclicality during the crisis.  However, when comparing this graph to 
Table 13, the bullwhip effect during the crisis was much lower than before and after.  Again, as in 
previous levels, the magnitude of the bullwhip effect cannot be determined through cyclicality. 




Figure 22. Helmerich & Payne, Inc. Plotted Production and Demand 
Examining Table 13, Noble Corporation, Transocean Ltd., Nabors Industries, Ensco plc 
and Patterson-UTI appeared to have reduced the bullwhip effect continuously from 2004 to 2012. 
The other two companies experienced a dip in the bullwhip effect during the crisis but it 
increased again afterwards. This can be seen due to the steep increase in production during the 
crisis. 
Table 13. Bullwhip Effect Values Before and After the Oil Crisis in the Drilling Level 
Company 2004-2006  BE 2007-2009   BE 2010-2012   BE 
Nabors Industries, Inc. 5.95 3.09 1.96 
Transocean Ltd. 8.72 3.41 0.68 
Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc. 7.76 3.37 2.71 
Noble Corporation 29.59 27.88 2.96 
Helmerich & Payne, Inc. 6.51 2.57 3.37 
Ensco plc 45.31 16.55 4.17 
Rowan Companies 6.56 4.55 4.57 
 
Relationship between the size of the company, the bullwhip effect it exhibits and the 
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26 showed that smaller companies tend to exhibit larger bullwhip effect. Small companies have 
more of a fixed capacity and they do not have as steady of a demand compared to larger 
companies. When there is a considerably large change in demand, their inventory is not enough to 
buffer and they must adjust the production accordingly, resulting in larger variability in 
production. Larger companies would have a larger amount of inventory, meaning larger buffers to 
adapt to any change in demand variability. If smaller companies are causing the variability to go 
up the chain, that means that the large companies in this level are able to keep the production 
variability low enough that it does not affect its suppliers as much as the small companies. 
Figure 23. Correlation between C.V. of Demand of Drilling Companies and BE Ratio 
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Figure 25. Correlation between Size of Drilling Companies and C.V. of Demand 
Figure 26. Correlation between Size of Drilling Companies and C.V. of Production 
Summarizing the drilling level, the bullwhip effect was exhibited in all the companies but 
no obvious cyclicality patterns were seen in any of the companies. A comparison of the small and 
large companies were not possible in this level since all the companies were categorized as large, 
but the largest company in the group did have the smallest bullwhip effect ratio which supports 
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3.3.5 Service and Equipment 
Eighteen companies were considered in this sample with two small companies and 16 
large companies. Similar to the drilling level, all the companies in this level have a bullwhip 
effect present. Looking at Table 14, an increasing bullwhip effect value can be seen as the size of 
the company becomes smaller. Starting with Schlumberger as the largest company with a 
bullwhip effect of 1.55 and ending with Bolt Technology was the smallest company with 3.92. 
Table 14. Data on Companies in the Service and Equipment Level 









and Demand Pattern 
Schlumberger 80,125 Large 1.55 0.44 Non-cyclic 
Halliburton 73,889 Large 1.25 0.25 Non-cyclic 
Weatherford 
International 
44,722 Large 1.63 0.49 Non-cyclic  
Baker Hughes 41,133 Large 1.44 0.51 Non-cyclic 
National Oilwell 
Varco 
35,051 Large 2.28 0.49 Non-cyclic 
FMC Technologies 11,922 Large 1.84 0.25 Non-cyclic 
Oceaneering 
International, Inc. 
7,678 Large 1.86 0.34 Non-cyclic 
Oil States 
International, Inc 
6,229 Large 1.95 0.41 Non-cyclic 
Superior Energy 
Services 
5,761 Large 2.77 0.76 Non-cyclic 
Core Laboratories 4,822 Large 3.77 0.20 Non-cyclic 
RPC, Inc 2,397 Large 3.34 0.61 Non-cyclic 
Helix Energy 
Solutions Group 
2,051 Large 1.32 0.48 Non-cyclic 
Dril-Quip, Inc. 1,928 Large 3.90 0.29 Non-cyclic 
GulfMark Offshore,  
Inc. 
1,499 Large 4.81 0.35 Non-cyclic 
Dawson Geophysical 
Company 
1,138 Large 1.49 0.41 Non-cyclic 
CARBO Ceramics 721 Large 2.79 0.39 Non-cyclic 
Natural Gas Services 
Group, Inc. 
243 Small 3.46 0.40 Non-cyclic 




When looking at the plotted graphs, many companies had many sudden ups and downs 
but since it was non-consistently occurring, none was categorized as cyclic. When the plotted 
production and demand patterns were compared with Table 14, Schlumberger, as shown in Figure 
27, showed a decreasing bullwhip effect continuously from 2004 to 2012.  
Figure 27. Schlumberger Plotted Production and Demand 
However, Natural Gas Services as shown in Figure 28 had a considerably larger bullwhip 
effect during that period and it can be seen from the large spikes it generated in 2008-2009. Bolt 
Technology, the smallest company, also had a large increase in production from 2007-2009. 
Since they were in a smoother flow with their demand in that period compared to Natural Gas 
Services, the bullwhip effect they exhibited in that period was not as high and continuously 
decreased afterwards. The plotted production and demand graphs from the downstream level can 
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Figure 28. Natural Gas Services Plotted Production and Demand 
In Table 15 Natural Gas Services, Superior Energy Services and Dril-Quip, Inc had 
substantially larger bullwhip effect values during the crisis. Similar to previous levels, it appears 
that they had a sudden reaction to the crisis by increasing or implementing sudden changes to 
their production whereas their demand is not behaving as extreme as they expected it to be.   
Table 15. BE Ratios Before and After the Oil Crisis in the Service & Equipment Level 
Company 2004-2006  BE 2007-2009   BE 2010-2012   BE 
Schlumberger 3.61 1.96 1.43 
Halliburton 1.84 2.39 1.16 
Weatherford 
International 
3.18 1.37 1.43 
Baker Hughes 7.53 2.25 1.35 
National Oilwell 
Varco 
2.19 2.67 2.15 
FMC Technologies 1.65 2.06 1.54 
Oceaneering 
International, Inc. 
2.80 1.06 1.98 
Oil States 
International, Inc 
1.29 3.22 1.93 
Superior Energy 
Services 
7.78 18.70 2.61 
Core Laboratories 4.56 2.86 2.93 
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2.85 1.28 1.13 
Dril-Quip, Inc. 4.49 6.72 3.60 
GulfMark Offshore,  
Inc. 
30.66 5.76 6.85 
Dawson Geophysical 
Company 
1.77 2.90 1.62 
CARBO Ceramics 2.48 2.45 2.93 
Natural Gas Services 
Group, Inc. 
2.34 9.61 2.22 
Bolt Technology 4.8 3.52 2.89 
 
The companies that were seen to continuously decrease were Schlumberger, Helix 
Energy Solutions and Bolt Technology. Since both the largest and the smallest companies were 
able to reduce the bullwhip effect from 2004 to 2012, it would be advantageous to learn from the 
strategies they used.  
Relationship between the size of the company, the bullwhip effect it exhibits and the 
variability of production and demand it experiences is shown in Figures 29 to 32. It cannot be 
concluded the amount of demand variability increases or decreases based on the size of the 
company, meaning that both large and small companies face the same amount of demand 
variability. However, Figure 30 and 32 showed that the smaller companies exhibit higher 
variability in production and larger bullwhip effect. Small companies have more of a fixed 
capacity and they do not have as steady of a demand compared to larger companies. So when 
there is a large change in demand, their inventory is not enough to buffer and they must adjust the 
production accordingly, resulting in larger variability in production. Larger companies would 
have a larger amount of inventory, meaning larger buffers to adapt to any change in demand 
variability. If smaller sized companies are causing the variability to go up the chain, that means 
that the large companies in this level are able to keep the production variability low enough that it 
does not affect its suppliers as much as the small companies. 
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Figure 29. Correlation between C.V. of Demand of S&E Companies and BE Ratio 
Figure 30. Correlation between Size of S&E Companies and BE Ratio  
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Figure 32.  Correlation between Size of S&E Companies and C.V. of Production 
Summarizing the service and equipment level, the bullwhip effect ratio was seen to 
decrease as the size of the company grew; again, this supports answering the third research 
question. No obvious cyclical patterns were seen in any of the companies. In terms of the crisis, 
both small and large companies were susceptible to it. 
3.4 Aggregate Analysis of Each Level in the Supply Chain 
This section examines the behavior of each level in the supply chain. The bullwhip effect 
values and coefficient of variation of production and demand of each company were compiled 
and averaged. The same was done for the coefficient of variation of demand. Results are shown in 
Table 16.  
Table 16. Aggregate Data on Each Level 
 Service and 
Equipment 
Drilling Upstream Midstream Downstream 
Average Bullwhip 
Effect Ratio 
2.52 3.80 22.30 1.44 1.10 
C.V. of Demand 0.41 0.41 0.46 0.48 0.56 
C.V. of Production 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.37 
Number of 
Companies 






















Average number of Employees 
Correlation between Size and C.V. of Production  
Service & Equipment 
ρ = -0.278 
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It provides evidence that that there is a bullwhip effect in the oil and gas industry from 
downstream to upstream due to the amplified bullwhip effect value. However, the values decrease 
from upstream to service and equipment. Cachon et al. (2007) concluded that the manufacturing 
industry tends to have lower bullwhip effect values due to production smoothing. Since the 
Service and Equipment and Drilling level mainly consist of manufacturing, it is assumed that this 
decreasing phenomenon is due to smoothing of production.  
Table 17 shows that the service and equipment level has a BE ratio much larger than one. 
The bullwhip effect did not magnify from upstream to the service and equipment level and the 
variability of demand and production decreases. Even if this decreasing occurrence happens as it 
goes to the upper suppliers of this level, it would be assumed that the BE ratio is still larger than 
one. In addition, even though the variability of demand production decreases, the difference 
between levels are not substantially high, meaning the amount of variability in the supply chain is 
notable on the small companies. 
Table 17. BE Ratio, C.V. of Demand and Production Comparison between Small and Large 
Companies in Each Level 
  Service and 
Equipment 
Drilling Upstream Midstream Downstream 
B
E
 Small Companies 3.69 - 22.97 1.47 0.74 











0.38 - 0.47 0.58 0.62 
Large Companies 












Small Companies 0.38 - 0.47 0.54 0.34 




To see the comparison of the bullwhip effect, C.V. of demand and production in the 
aggregate level, the respective values of the small and the large companies were averaged 
accordingly. Table 17 shows that in the service and equipment, upstream and midstream level the 
small companies exhibit a larger bullwhip effect than the large companies. However, demand 
variability is seen to decrease as it flows up the chain but production variability varies and does 
not have a noteworthy trend. 
When the study analyzed the bullwhip effect, C.V. of demand, and C.V. of production in 
each level during the crisis, it was apparent that the values are considerably larger in the upper 
three levels: service and equipment, drilling and upstream. In terms of the bullwhip effect ratio, 
the upstream level was the only level that performed poorly during the crisis with a much larger 
bullwhip effect value compared to the other periods, whether a small or a large company (Table 
17). The downstream level was the only level to appear to experience higher demand variability 
during the crisis. Even though service and equipment and drilling had larger bullwhip effect 
values, they showed improvement from 2004 to 2006. This is mainly due to the decreasing trends 
exhibited by the large companies.  
Referring to Table 18, the midstream and downstream levels had lower bullwhip effect 
values but their performance was not much better since they experienced a dip in the crisis but it 
reached its peak after crisis. However, when the midstream level is analyzed further, the small 
companies showed improvement whereas the large companies’ bullwhip increased over time. The 
opposite was seen in the downstream level. This could be due to factors such as lagging results 
from their actions during the crisis or increased production after the crisis that does not match the 




Table 18. BE Ratio, C.V. of Demand and Production Before, During and After Oil Crisis 
Comparison of Each Level 
   Service 
and 
Equipment 


















Small 3.57 - 26.37 1.79 0.61 
Large 5.40 15.77 26.29 1.40 1.33 




Small 6.57 - 34.54 1.47 0.63 
Large 3.90 8.77 180.21 1.64 0.96 




Small 2.56 - 37.10 1.39 1.32 
Large 2.37 2.92 32.20 1.79 1.48 















Small 0.48 - 0.37 0.43 0.53 
Large 0.22 0.20 0.35 0.47 0.43 




Small 0.25 - 0.25 0.26 0.66 
Large 0.14 0.22 0.30 0.36 0.52 




Small 0.34 - 0.28 0.21 0.61 
Large 0.22 0.29 0.27 0.15 0.47 

















Small 0.47 - 0.39 0.38 0.28 
Large 0.27 0.35 0.30 0.41 0.32 




Small 0.31 - 0.38 0.37 0.38 
Large 0.18 0.23 0.40 0.28 0.32 




Small 0.27 - 0.21 0.20 0.37 
Large 0.22 0.28 0.21 0.17 0.32 
Total 0.24 0.28 0.21 0.18 0.35 
 
Throughout the study, cyclicality was observed for each company. Looking at cyclical 
patterns, the midstream and downstream level appear to have more cyclical production compared 
to the upper levels. One reason was that they have a more direct view of the demand and due to 




This study wanted to confirm cyclicality in each level of the supply chain by summing 
the demand of all the companies in each level and then averaging them based on the quarters. 
Seasonality of demand was seen consistently throughout the supply chain. Demand is generally 
higher during the fourth quarter and lowest in the first quarter, as shown in Table 19. The actual 
demand values can be seen in Appendix 6. 






Drilling Upstream Midstream Downstream 
Q4 Q4 Q4 Q4 Q3 
Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q4 
Q2 Q2 Q2 Q1 Q2 
Q1 Q1 Q1 Q2 Q1 
 
3.4 Comparison to Companies with an Integrated Supply Chain 
The supply chain defined thus far is a compilation of multiple companies from pre-
defined levels of the supply chain. However, there were large companies that have integrated the 
multiple levels into one controlled supply chain system. Chen et al. (2000) stated that a supply 
chain with centralized demand information should demonstrate smaller bullwhip effect. This 
study compared the decentralized supply chain with three large integrated, centralized, 
companies: Chevron, ExxonMobil and Questar Corporation. Questar Corporation had an 
exploration and production segment until 2010, when it was sold to QEP Resources. Only the 
downstream and midstream levels were analyzed.  
Table 20, indicates that the larger integrated companies did substantially better in the 
upstream level compared to the decentralized companies. The downstream level of the integrated 
companies exhibited larger bullwhip effects compared to the decentralized supply chain. Questar 
Corporation was the only company that exhibited a larger bullwhip effect as it went upstream 




Table 20. Comparison of Integrated Companies with the Decentralized Supply Chain 
 Avg. Number of Employees Upstream Midstream Downstream 
Decentralized 
Supply Chain 
- 22.30 1.44 1.10 
ExxonMobil 81,744 2.56 - 1.39 
Chevron 56,813 2.52 - 1.76 
Questar 
Corporation 688 - 2.34 1.20 
 
Referring to the plotted production and demand data of the three companies, it shows that 
Questar Corporation(Figure 32)  had a cyclic pattern compared to the two larger companies, 
ExxonMobil and Chevron. The plotted production and demand of each integrated company can 
be seen in Appendix 7. 
The three integrated companies exhibited the bullwhip effect. However, the larger 
companies did not appear to have a large increase as it went up the supply chain and the smaller 
company did.  




























































4.1 Research Questions 
The research questions in this study were answered based on what was concluded from the 
analyses of the data. The three research questions this thesis tried to answer are the following: 
 Research Question 1: Does the bullwhip effect exist in the oil and gas industry? 
 Research Question 2:  Does the service and equipment level exhibit the highest demand 
variability in the supply chain? 
 Research Question 3: Are smaller sized companies more susceptible to larger demand 
variability than larger sized companies? 
 
4.1.1. Research Question 1 
To answer the first research question, the bullwhip effect was analyzed at three different 
levels of the industry; at the individual level, the aggregate level and the supply chain as a whole.  
When the companies were looked at individually based on the level in which they were 
categorized, it showed that the number of companies that have the bullwhip effect increased as 
the level increased. This information is shown in Table 21. With a high percentage of bullwhip 
effect existence in each level, >99%, it shows that the bullwhip effect is exhibited by the majority 




Table 21. Summary of companies in Each Level with BE 
 Service and 
Equipment 





100% 100% 99.94% 99.94% 99.64% 
18 out of 18 6 out of 6 48 out of 51 15 out of 16 7 out of 11 
 
At the aggregate level, indicated in Table 22, all the levels of the supply chain have a 
bullwhip effect ratio larger than 1, meaning that the bullwhip effect exists in each level of the 
supply chain. It is evident that the bullwhip effect in the midstream and the downstream level are 
much lower than the others. This can be explained due to the proximity of these two levels to the 
demand from the market. 
Table 22. Average BE of Each Level 
 Service and 
Equipment 
Drilling Upstream Midstream Downstream 
Average Bullwhip 
Effect Ratio 
2.52 3.80 22.30 1.44 1.10 
 
To see if the bullwhip effect exists in the industry, the variance of production over the 
variance of demand should amplify as it goes up the supply chain. This shows as the bullwhip 
amplifies starting from the downstream level (1.10), then larger in the midstream level (1.44) and 
even larger as it arrives in the   upstream level (22.30). However, this amplification did not 
continue as it goes further up the supply chain. Two reasons were found to explain this; 
production smoothing and diversification strategy. Production smoothing was mentioned by 
Cachon et al. (2007) to explain the lack of amplification in the manufacturing industry and this 
would be applicable in this study since the two levels that show lower amplification are mostly 
manufacturing type companies. The other reason was diversification strategy; this would be 
applicable for the service and equipment industry since they provide multiple products and 
57 
 
service for multiple levels of the supply chain. This shows that they are not tied to the demand of 
the level ahead of them. However, the diversification would not be relevant for the drilling level 
since they directly supply services and products to the upstream level. 
Based on these results, the study was able to answer the first research question; the data 
provides evidence that bullwhip effect exists in the oil and gas industry up to the upstream level. 
 
4.1.2. Research Question 2 
The second research question states that the service and equipment level has the highest 
demand variability. The aim of this research question was to see if the problems experienced by 
the small suppliers in Oklahoma that supplied the service and equipment level were the result of a 
widespread effect of the bullwhip across the industry. To answer this research question, the 
bullwhip effect of the service and equipment level should be larger when compared to the other 
levels of the supply chain. 
The BE ratios and C.V. of demand of each level is shown in Table 23. Evidently, the 
bullwhip effect exhibited is not larger than the levels of the supply chain it directly supplies. The 
C.V. of demand does not seem to increase and the service and equipment level shows the lowest 
demand variability.  
Table 23. BE Ratios and C.V. of Demand of Each Level in the Supply Chain 
  Service 
and 
Equipment 
Drilling Upstream Midstream Downstream 
BE Ratio 2.52 3.80 22.30 1.44 1.10 
C.V. of Demand 0.41 0.42 0.46 0.48 0.56 
 
It was mentioned previously that the companies in the service and equipment level do not 
tend to focus on supplying to one level. Due to this fact, the service and equipment level was split 
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based on the main level they supply directly, seen from the majority of the offerings they provide 
or where most of their revenue comes from. It was found that three mostly serve the drilling 
companies, three mostly serve the midstream companies, and 12 mostly serve the upstream 
companies. The companies categorized can be seen in Table 24. 
Table 24.  List of Split Service and Equipment Level Companies 
Drilling Upstream Midstream 
CARBO Ceramics RPC, Inc Oil States International, Inc. 
Helix Energy Solutions 
Group 
National Oilwell Varco Natural Gas Services Group, Inc. 
Dril-Quip, Inc. Core Laboratories GulfMark Offshore,  Inc. 
 Superior Energy Services  
 Oceaneering International, Inc.  
 Schlumberger  
 Halliburton  
 Baker Hughes  
 FMC Technologies  
 Weatherford International  






From the companies listed in Table 25, the bullwhip effect and C.V. of demand for each 
company was calculated and then averaged with the other companies in the group. These values 
were then compared to the values from the level it directly supplied. The BE ratio of the service 
and equipment level was only larger when compared to the midstream level. The C.V. of demand 
of segmented service and equipment level exhibited similar behavior and did not have a C.V. of 
demand larger than any of the levels it directly supplies.  Since the value is not the largest in the 
supply chain, the data provided evidence that the demand variability was not largest at the service 
and equipment level.  
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2.67 3.80 2.26 22.30 3.41 1.44 
C.V. of 
Demand 
0.38 0.42 0.43 0.46 0.38 0.56 
 
4.1.3. Research Question 3 
Since NPDC’s mission is to provide support to the small and medium sized 
manufacturers in Oklahoma, it was of interest to this study to see if smaller companies were more 
susceptible to the bullwhip effect and demand variability than larger companies in the oil and gas 
industry. To answer this research question, the study compared the bullwhip effect and the C.V. 
of demand of the small companies to the large companies in each level. This can be seen in Table 
26.  
Table 26. BE Ratio, C.V. of Demand Comparison between Small and Large Companies in Each 













3.69 - 23.51 1.47 0.74 17.53 
Large 
Companies 













0.38 - 0.47 0.58 0.62 0.51 
Large 
Companies 
0.42 0.41 0.45 0.42 0.55 0.45 
 
From the data, evidence showed that small companies tend to have larger bullwhip effect 
values then their larger counterparts in every level except for drilling and downstream. There 
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were no small companies in the drilling sample and only two small companies in the downstream 
level and neither one showed the presence of the bullwhip effect. When all the BE ratios of the 
small companies in the sample were averaged, it showed that the bullwhip effect was 
considerably larger in the small companies than in the large ones. Figure 33 emphasized this with 
higher BE ratios at smaller number of employees.  
The same phenomenon is seen when analyzing the C.V. of demand of each level. Only 
the small companies of the service and equipment did not exhibit higher demand variability when 
compared with its larger counterparts. However, in general it is seen that the smaller companies 
exhibit larger demand variability. Thus, the data provides evidence that smaller sized companies 
are more susceptible to higher demand variability when compare to larger sized companies.  
Reasonably, the smaller companies have smaller capital to be flexible in adjusting their 
labor and production capacities to adapt to sudden changes in demand. 
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This study analyzed data from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) on oil and gas 
companies. A supply chain model was defined for this industry with five sequential levels. The 
bullwhip effect was evaluated in each company and then aggregated to further investigate its 
existence in a more aggregate level -- the supply chain of the oil and gas industry. The bullwhip 
effect was then examined in terms of how it behaved before, during and after the oil crisis in 
2008.  
The analysis of the bullwhip effect in the individual level showed the behavior of the 
company in terms of its production and demand, susceptibility to the bullwhip effect and how it 
dealt with the oil crisis. Exploration in this level showed cyclical pattern of production and 
demand in certain companies. When compared to the bullwhip effect of the company, each 
company behaved differently. This led to the conclusion that the magnitude of the bullwhip effect 
did not determine the existence of cyclicality in production and demand of that company. 
Cyclicality was also shown to exist in both the large and small companies, which provided 
evidence that it has no relation to the size of the company. 
Cyclicality of the companies was observed through the aggregate level through 
seasonality of demand. This was determined through ranking of the quarters that experienced the 
highest demands. It was seen in 4 out of 5 levels that the 4
th
 quarter of the year had the largest 
demand and the 1
st
 quarter had the lowest demand. 
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The bullwhip effect for each company varied. A majority of the companies showed that 
they were dealing with the bullwhip effect. The third research question asked if small companies 
had larger bullwhip effect and large companies had smaller ones. This was not always the case 
when each company was analyzed.  Some large companies were seen to have high BE ratios and 
some small companies were found not to have the bullwhip effect. Nevertheless, these were 
exceptions and were not common to find in the rest of the sample. When all the small companies 
were analyzed together, it showed that the bullwhip effect they incurred was considerably larger 
than what the large companies experience. 
At each level, the size of the company was correlated with the size of the bullwhip it 
exhibited and the amount of variability of production and demand it experienced. All levels 
showed that high bullwhip effect was highly correlated with low demand variability. Most levels 
showed that smaller companies experienced high variability in demand and production. The 
upstream and downstream levels showed that both small and large companies had similar amount 
of variability in production and also showed that the bullwhip effect was exhibited by large 
companies. The inventory of small companies cannot handle demand variation that is higher or 
similar to theirs especially when it comes from a large company. The other three levels showed 
that the bullwhip effect is exhibited by smaller companies. Larger companies would have larger 
inventory, meaning larger buffers to adapt to any change in demand variability. If the smaller 
companies are causing the variability to go up the chain, that means that the large companies in 
this level are able to keep the production variability low enough that it does not affect its 
suppliers as much as the small companies.  
At the aggregate level, it showed how prominent the existence the bullwhip effect was 
since more than 99% in every level had an amplification ratio larger than 1. In addition, the 
bullwhip effect amplified as it went from downstream to midstream and through the upstream 
level. These indicate that the bullwhip effect is especially present in the oil and gas industry. 
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However, this amplification did not continue through the highest level of the defined supply 
chain, which was the service and equipment level. It was concluded that the drilling level had a 
smaller effect in comparison to the upstream level due to production smoothing. Due to the 
multiple levels to which the S&E level supplies, it was concluded that their smaller value was due 
to a diversification strategy. 
This study also analyzed the supply chain levels in terms of how they did during the oil 
crisis. The upstream level did the worst since it had the largest bullwhip and was the only level 
that showed an increase in bullwhip effect at that time. This existed in both the small and large 
companies. The S&E and drilling level continuously increased their bullwhip by decreasing its 
levels at each period: before, during and after the crisis. The midstream and downstream, though 
having the lowest bullwhip effect values, exhibited a substantially large increase of the bullwhip 
effect after a sudden dip during the crisis. Midstream small companies improved over time 
whereas the large companies did the exact opposite and downstream did the exact opposite. These 
represent how the majority of the companies in each level reacted before, during and after the oil 
crisis in 2008. 
To conclude, the data obtained in this thesis, evidence provided that the high variability 
the oil equipment suppliers experienced were due to their sizes and not due to their position in the 
supply chain. 
5.1 Recommendation for Further Work 
Since this study examined the presence of the bullwhip effect, an in-depth study should 
be conducted on why amplification of the bullwhip effect stopped at the upstream level. Even 
though some conclusions were made through literature and the characteristics of the product that 
the company provided, an in-depth survey to the drilling and S&E level would give a more 
accurate explanation for the phenomenon.  
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This study shows that some companies did well than others in improving the bullwhip 
effect: whether it is from continuously declining BE ratios from 2004 to 2012 or from a 
dampening of the bullwhip effect after oil crisis. Further investigation on what strategies these 
companies used to achieve these results would be a good guide for those companies who have not 
been able to accomplish that. 
During the study, there was effort to categorize the companies based on their main 
product being oil or natural gas. It was clear which companies provided which type of product 
when looking at downstream and midstream levels. However, going up the supply chain and 
looking at the upstream and higher levels, most companies did a combination of both products 
and the separation was no longer clear. There was not much that could be concluded just with the 
separated midstream and downstream. It is deemed more beneficial if further study was 
conducted tracking the production, processing, storage and distribution of natural gas and oil 
directly through the supply chain to see how the behavior of the companies differ in relation to 
the product they deliver. 
This study analyzed the behavior of the bullwhip effect before, during and after the oil 
crisis. Further investigation in how the amplification of demand and production up the oil and gas 
supply chain in relation to a change in the oil price will provide insight on what each level might 
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Natural Gas Services 









Drilling Upstream Midstream Downstream 
1 15,946,799 2,740,361 12,721,810 23,606,035 30,756,070 
2 16,855,431 2,932,954 15,351,792 22,943,046 33,147,327 
3 17,540,837 2,905,349 18,122,334 23,920,412 34,862,211 
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Appendix 7. Plotted Production and Demand Graphs of Integrated Companies 
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